"Zero."

That’s how Adm. John Aquilino, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, answered when asked if the United States has the capabilities to match China’s arsenal of theater-range missiles (between 500 and 5500 km).

Asked if the United States has any missiles under development at the upper end of that range (3000-5000 km), the answer was the same: no.

This shocking missile gap calls into question America’s ability to deter war – or win if deterrence fails.

US WOULD BE CRAZY TO IGNORE GROWING HAZARDS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA

The Pentagon reports that China fields over 1,250 ground-launched theater-range ballistic and cruise missiles that can hit U.S. targets across the Indo-Pacific. In fact, in 2021, China tested more ballistic missiles than the rest of the world combined.

The PLA Rocket Force is central to China’s "anti-access/area denial" strategy, designed to push U.S. forces out of the first and second island chains by demonstrating that they can, and will, hit U.S. forces inside it. 

Recent war games demonstrate the logic of China’s counter-intervention strategy. In a battle for Taiwan, China’s precision salvos striking U.S. military bases and Navy ships as far out as Guam would deal devastating losses to U.S. air and seapower. A CSIS scenario showed that in four weeks of fighting, the U.S. lost hundreds of aircraft, and bases on Guam were devastated, which would force commanders to only rely on expensive, high-end air and naval forces to counterattack – dangerously limiting the lethality of their forces. 

This deadly gap has been decades in the making.

For years, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty hamstrung our ability to develop these theater-range ground-launched missiles. It prohibited the United States and Russia – but not China – from deploying those kinds of capabilities anywhere in the world.

After Russia was caught cheating, the Trump administration rightly withdrew from the treaty in 2019. Although the withdrawal freed up the Pentagon to develop new missile capabilities, we have made little progress in offsetting China’s rocket force. It will take an act of Congress to force the Pentagon to level the playing field in long-range strike.

And that is exactly what we are going to do. Through our Rings of Fire Act of 2023, we will require the Pentagon to develop a strategy for offsetting China’s missile advantages. The strategy would assess gaps in our theater-range strike capabilities in the Indo-Pacific and the military requirements to close them. 

BIDEN'S CLIMATE AGENDA MAKES US DANGEROUSLY DEPENDENT ON CHINA. HERE'S WHAT WE MUST DO

The Pentagon would develop concepts for operating these fires, and identify key allies and basing locations to put them to use. The goal is to field credible and affordable combat power across the Pacific, reducing China’s homefield advantage.

An Indo-Pacific missile strategy should take advantage of geography. While China fields missiles on the mainland, the United States can deploy them across the region with the support of partners and allies. Japan and the Philippines could host shorter-range systems while longer-range systems could be deployed to northern Australia, the Pacific Islands and Alaska. This would establish "rings of fire" that constitute a defense-in-depth across the Pacific.

The United States has some shorter-range capabilities in its arsenal, such as Precision Strike Missiles. But the Biden administration failed to budget for them – with $1 billion of unfunded missile requirements for the Indo-Pacific. This negligence demonstrates a lack of urgency and seriousness in implementing the National Defense Strategy that classifies China as our biggest challenge. 

Worse, despite long-range precision fires being a top modernization priority of the Army, the U.S. has no intermediate-range systems under development. Meanwhile, the PRC’s Dongfeng-26, for example, reaches upwards of 4000km – capable of striking Guam. 

This is where China’s military has stolen a march, given the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific, and where the United States needs to catch up.

Ground-based missiles would give a U.S. commander a range of affordable, ready strike options and help cover down for other U.S. forces making their way to the fight. They would make China’s forces defend against unpredictable strikes from varying distances and approaches, thereby enhancing deterrence.

CLICK HERE TO GET THE OPINION NEWSLETTER

But it should not only be the United States building and fielding such systems. An Indo-Pacific missile strategy must leverage allies and partners to join in development and production of these systems, reducing the cost to the taxpayer while bolstering interoperability for the warfighter. 

The Australians have already indicated a willingness to modernize their guided weapons programs and manufacture long-range weapons in-country. Under Pillar II of AUKUS, we can get more bang for our buck by sharing the costs and mutually accelerating our development and production timelines of next-generation missile technologies with our closest allies in the region where they are needed. 

Building these "rings of fire" in concert with our closest allies would enhance deterrence and pose dangerous dilemmas for PLA planners. If we can close the missile gap and thereby shift the regional balance of power in our favor, this gives us a greater chance of making Xi Jinping think twice before attempting to take Taiwan by force.

But even after our legislation passes and if the Pentagon responds by producing a coherent strategy for fielding these precision fires, making rings of fire a reality will require sustained oversight. Restoring deterrence in the Indo-Pacific demands dedicated attention from the highest levels of the Pentagon, State Department and – of course – Congress. 

Given the growing risks of great power conflict in the Indo-Pacific, we cannot waste any more time.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM REP. MIKE GALLAGHER

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM SEN. JONI ERNST

Joni Ernst, a Republican, represents Iowa in the U.S. Senate.